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Mixon v. One Newco, Inc.: A Look
at Dormant Mineral Acts
INTRODUCTION
Dormant mineral acts, or lapse statutesI are an important
legal principle, especially in those states where minerals have a
significant economic influence. 2 The statutes affect property which
is divided into separate estates. When a specified period of time
passes without the mineral estate owner exercising his or her use
rights, the acts reunite the surface interest with the mineral
interest. By reuniting the estates, the statute makes the entire
property potentially more productive. These lapse statutes also
clarify ownership of the land.
3
For many years the constitutionality of such statutes was
questioned. In Texaco v. Short,4 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana Dormant Min-
eral Interests Act5 against challenges that the statute constituted
a taking without compensation, 6 and violated the notice provi-
sion of the due process clause as well as the equal protection
clause.
7
A majority of states that enacted lapse statutes about the
same time as Indiana, set a twenty year window after which a
lapse would occur. 8 However, Georgia chose a much shorter
period of seven years.9 In Mixon v. One Newco, Inc.,10 the most
recent ruling in the area of lapse statutes, the United States
Pindar, Marketability of Titles-Effect of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 34 MERcER L.
Rv. 1005, 1005 (1983).
Van Slooten v. Larsen, 299 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Mich. 1980); see also Texaco v.
Short, 454 U.S. 516, 524 n.15 (1982).
Short, 454 U.S. at 523 (quoting Short, 406 N.E.2d at 627).
Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 to 8 (Bums 1980 & Supp. 1989).
6 U.S. CONST. amends. V., XIV at § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Illinois 25 years; Michigan 20 years; Minnesota 20 years; Nebraska 23 years;
but see Wisconsin 10 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(a) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
863 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1989).
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld Georgia's
Dormant Mineral Rights Act." This comment analyzes that de-
cision. It discusses the possible expansion of the application of
lapse statutes in two areas: first, the substantial shortening of
the time period before rights are lost, and second, limiting the
ways to retain those rights. A brief history, including the Su-
preme Court's holding in Short, sets the stage for the changes
occurring in the area of dormant mineral interests.
I. HISTORY
Until the United States Supreme Court decided Short, much
controversy surrounded the lapse statutes that state legislatures
began enacting about twenty-five years ago. 2 Short involved the
Indiana Dormant Mineral Interest Act." This act, passed in
1971, provided for the automatic lapse of a mineral interest
where the mineral owner had failed to use, to register, or to pay
property taxes for twenty years. 14 The Supreme Court held that
the Indiana statute was a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power. 5 The Court reasoned that the Act's two year grace period
following its passage provided adequate protection to the owners
of the mineral rights.' 6 The Court also determined there was no
"taking without compensation" because an individual's failure
to follow the procedures required by the state resulted in an
abandonment. Thus, there was nothing for which to compensate
the property owner. 17
The Court reasoned that the actions required by the state to
define abandonment accomplished the goals set by the legislature
in creating the lapse statute. These goals include remedying
uncertainties in titles and facilitating the exploitation of energy
sources and other valuable mineral resources.'8 Registration of
the mineral interest was found to be a minimal burden to place
on the owner of those mineral interests.' 9 The Court further held
that the exception for holders of multiple mineral interests was
1 Id. at 851.
12 Michigan 1963, Nebraska 1967, Indiana 1971, Wisconsin 1973.
11 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 to 8 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1989).
" IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1.
11 Short, 454 U.S. at 529.
16 Id. at 532-33.
11 Id. at 530.
11 Id. at 524 n.15.
19 Id. at 538.
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not a violation of the equal protection clause because the state's
interest was related to the central purpose of the Act.2 Further-
more, there is no adverse impact on those that do not hold
multiple interests. 2' The Court further determined that the holder
of the mineral interest is presumed to have knowledge of the
Act" and that because of the self-executing provision, "3 the
notice required for a judicial proceeding is not applicable.2
II. GEORGIA'S DORMANT MIERAL STATUTE
Prior to the enactment of Georgia's Dormant Mineral Rights
Act in 1975,2 Brooke v. Delingei" governed the rights of sur-
face owners against the mineral rights holders. Mere nonuse or
prescription27 did not render loss of title of the mineral rights.
For the mineral owner to lose title, there must have been an
actual adverse use of the minerals by the one claiming title.2
The Georgia legislature enacted its dormant mineral rights
statute to "provide an additional method for obtaining good
title to property.'"' However, the statute limits the use of this
method to the owner of the surface estate. The Georgia statute
provides that the surface rights' owner may regain title to severed
mineral rights by filing a petition in superior court for the county
where the land is located.30 In order for the surface owner to
regain title, the mineral owner must fail to work the mineral
estate or pay property taxes for the seven years since the con-
veyance which immediately preceded the filing of the petition.
31
The statute exempts holders of leases which pertain to a specific
number of years . 2 Also exempt from the statute are owners of
10 Id. at 539-40 n.36 (holders of multiple interests more likely to produce minerals).
1, Short, 454 U.S. at 540.
22 Id. at 532.
" IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1.
Short, 454 U.S. at 533-35.
GA. CoDE ANN. § 44-5-168 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
17 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. 1941).
BLAcx's LAw DICTIoNARY (5th ed. 1979) (defining prescription as a "preemptory
and prepetual bar to ... action ... when creditor has been silent for a certain time
without urging his claim").
Brooke, 17 S.E.2d at 182.
Larkin v. Laster, 334 S.E.2d 158, 159 (Ga. 1985) (quoting Ga. L. 1975, p. 725).
"GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(bXl). •
" GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(a).
3 Id. at § 44-5-168(f).
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mineral rights that have leased those mineral rights in writing to
a licensed mining operator.33
Unlike the Indiana statute at issue in Short, the Georgia
statute does not include a specific "grace period." In Nelson v.
Bloodworth,34 the Georgia Supreme Court determined the first
date that a suit could be brought under this statute. The court
stated that the "seven years immediately preceding the filing"
meant that the period began to run, at the earliest, on the first
effective date of the statute, July 1, 1975. 5 Accordingly, July 1,
1982 was the first date upon which suits could have been brought
under this statute.
The Supreme Court of Georgia first upheld the constitution-
ality of Georgia's Dormant Mineral Rights Statute in Hayes v.
Howell.36 The purposes for the statute as stated by the court in
Hayes were: (1) "to encourage the use of the state's mineral
resources and the collection of taxes; or [(2)]- to encourage the
use of land free of interference by the holders of mineral rights.
who neither use nor pay taxes on them." '37 The court determined
that these were legitimate goals. The state's action, requiring the
mineral owner to use or pay taxes on the minerals, is rationally
related to those goals. 38 Because it meets these tests, the Act is
a reasonable exercise of police power.
As in Short, the Georgia statute itself does not divest the
mineral owner of his rights. Rather the owner causes the loss by
his or her failure to perform the minimal requirements of the
statute.
39
The Supreme Court of Georgia determined in Hinson v.
Loper ° that mineral rights leased according to the statute are
exempt even if the lease was initiated by a previous owner of
those rights. 4' This protects the rights of the lessees whether they
hold a lease for a certain number of years or as a licensed
mining operator.4 2
Id.; see also § 12-4-72(7) which provides: "Mining operator" means any person,
frm partnership, joint venture, association, corporation, municipality, or county engaged
in or controlling one or more surface mining operation.
3" 232 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1977).
31 Id. at 549.
3 308 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1983).
7 Id. at 176.
3s Id.
" Id.
304 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 1983).




Furthermore, the court found in Larkin v. Laster3 that
paying the taxes after a petition was filed does not toll the lapse
aspect of the statute" The Georgia Supreme Court also deter-
mined the payment of state or federal estate taxes does not meet
the requirements of the statute. 45 Similarly, payment of property
taxes by the surface owner does not inure to the mineral rights
if those rights are held separately. 46
Several question concerning the interpretation of Georgia's
lapse statute have been addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court
since the enactment in 1975. However, the act had not been
challenged in the federal courts until Mixon v. One Newco,
Inc.47
III. MixoN v. ONE NEWCO, INC.
A. Facts
The surface owner, Mixon, filed suit claiming ownership of
the mineral rights under Georgia's Dormant Mineral Rights Act.48
Mixon conveyed all interest in the mineral rights to Allied Chem-
ical Corporation ("Allied") on March 28, 1964. Allied worked
the mineral rights to some degree until 1971.49 Neither Allied
nor its successor, General Chemical Corporation (formerly known
as One Newco, Inc.) exercised the rights between 1972 and
1986.50 Moreover, the owners of the mineral rights failed to pay
taxes during those years. 5' Because neither Allied nor One Newco
was a licensed mining operator, 2 neither qualified for the explicit
statutory preemption under Georgia's Act. Following removal
from state court, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia entered a judgment in favor of Mixon uniting
his surface ownership with the mineral rights.53 Subsequently,
One Newco, the mineral interest holder, appealed.
,3 334 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 1985).
" Id. at 160.
41 Dubbers-Albrecht v. Nathan, 356 S.E.2d 205, 207 (Ga. 1987).
46 Hayes, 308 S.E.2d at 176.
4 863 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1989).




,2 Id.; see also supra note 33.
" Mixon. 863 F.2d at 847.
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On appeal One Newco argued: (1) the surface owner needed
to establish at least some affirmative acts of dominion with
respect to the minerals; (2) the interest was preserved by working
the rights at any time during the seven-year period immediately
following the conveyance of those rights; and (3) the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by the exclusion of fixed durational leases and leases to
licensed mining operators.
54
The appellant argued that despite the statutory requirements,
the surface owner must comply with traditional adverse posses-
sion requirements as well." These requirements include actual,
open, notorious, exclusive and adverse nonpermissive use for the
statutorily prescribed period.5 6 However, the court determined
that the statute "simply creates an additional method to acquire
title beyond traditional adverse possession.
'5 7
Traditional adverse possession law focuses on the steps one
must take to acquire the ownership.58 The statute's focus is on
the steps the owner of the mineral rights must follow to retain
ownership. 59 Affirmative action by the surface owner is required
in a traditional adverse possession. ° However, the Georgia stat-
ute imposes no burdens upon the surface owner.
6'
Appellants further argued that their use of the minerals
during the seven year period immediately following the convey-
ance permanently preserved their rights. 62 The statute provides
that if the mineral rights are not worked for "a period of seven
years since the date of the conveyance and for seven years
immmediately preceding the filing of the petition ' 63 they can be
lost. The court determined that the legislature chose a "floating
period" of seven years after the conveyance. 6 It concluded that
I /d. at 847-48.
, Id. at 819.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 49 (5th ed. 1979) (defining adverse possession as:
"nonpermissive use which is actual, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse for the
statutorily prescribed period.").
7 Mixon, 863 F.2d at 849; see also Larkin v. Laster, 334 S.E.2d 158, 159 (Ga.
1985).
'. Mixon, 863 F.2d at 849.
,9 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168.
Mixon, 863 F.2d at 849.
61 Id.
62 Id.




a definite period of seven years of noncompliance by the mineral
owner must immediately precede the filing of a petition by the
surface owner.
65
The Mixon court, interpreting the timing of the seven year
period, did not address the sufficiency of that seven year period.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Short left unanswered the
question of whether a shorter period of nonuse would be appro-
priate."
One Newco contended that Georgia's exclusion of fixed dur-
ational leases67 and leases to licensed mining operations" violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 9 In
addressing this issue, the court determined that when solely
economic interests are concerned, the proper standard of review
is whether the classification bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate purpose.
70
The Supreme Court found in Short that the Indiana Dormant
Mineral Interest Act's exemption of owners with multiple inter-
ests in the same county7 did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 72 Indiana had a legitimate purpose and the exemption
of multiple owners furthered that purpose. 73 In Mixon the Elev-
enth Circuit felt that the legislature probably preferred fixed
durational leases74 because of the problem that Georgia had
faced with perpetual leases. 7 The court also indicated that leas-
ing to licensed mining operators increased the chances that the
minerals would actually be mined and taxes collected on those
6 Id. The court raised the possibility that there may be an overlap of the two
seven-year periods.
Short, 454 U.S. 516, 536 n.28; but see GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-164 (1982).
Traditional adverse possession under color of title ripens in seven years under Georgia
law. Since Georgia's lapse statute is stated in terms of a "presumption of adverse
possession" it seems very logical that they would choose the seven-year period. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 preamble.
" A lease for a certain number of years.
6 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 (f); § 12-4-72(7).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Mixon, 863 F.2d at 850.
,0 Mixon, 863 F.2d at 851.
71 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-4.
72 Short, 454 U.S. at 539-40.
73 Id.
"4 See supra note 67.
7 Mixon, 863 F.2d at 851 (referring to Rehberg and McLaughlin, The Implied
Duty to Mine in Georgia, 20 GA. ST. B. J. 216 (1984); BLAcK's LAw DiCTIONARY 801
(5th ed. 1979) (defining perpetual leases: "A lease of lands which may last without
limitation as to time ....").
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minerals. 7 Therefore, because the distinction did bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose, the Mixon court held
the exclusion did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
77
This exclusion, plus the lack of registration as one of the
options for retaining ownership of the mineral rights, indicates
that Georgia is using its lapse statute as an economic tool. 78 The
Indiana Supreme Court recognized the economic impact carried
by similar lapse statutes. It stated, "The dependence of local
economies upon the mineral recovery industry and the entire
State upon limited fossil fuel resources illustrates the public
nature of these purposes." ' 79 Unlike some states that have enacted
dormant mineral rights legislation,w Georgia is not as interested
in the lost or unknown owners8 but rather is more concerned
about the use of the minerals and collection of taxes on those
minerals, s2 as an economic benefit for the State.
B. Unanswered Question
The Supreme Court in Short made it clear that the Indiana
statute passed judicial scrutiny with respect to the notice provi-
sions because it is self-executing. 83 "The Due Process Clause
does not require a defendant to notify a potential plaintiff that
a statute of limitations is about to run." 8' 4
The Mixon court declared that Georgia's lapse statute "con-
tains a built-in statutory notice" to the mineral rights owner.15
"6 Mixon, 863 F.2d at 851; but see McCoy v. Richards, 623 F.Supp. 1300, 1304-
05 (D.C. Ind. 1984); see also Kirby v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 463 N.E.2d 1127, 1129-30 (Ind.
App. I Dist. 1984).
" Mixon, 863 F.2d at 851.
71 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(a); see also Dubbers-Albrecht v. Nathan, 356 S.E.2d
205, 207 (Ga. 1987).
79 Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 524 n.15 (1981).
w See, Comment, Severed Mineral Interests of Unknown or Missing Owners in
Kentucky, 3 J. MN. L. & PoL'Y 185 (1987-88); See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712.01-.10
(West 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 1/2 para. 9201-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Ky.
Rav. STAT. ANN. § 353.460-.470 (Michie 1983); NEn. REn. STAT. § 57-228 to 231 (1988)
(Nebraska's statute does not apply retroactively); N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-42.1 to .9 (1983)
& Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-153 to 155 (1989 & Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 706.055, .057 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
81 Short & Thomas, Kentucky Mineral Law § 15.02 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
96 1/2, para. 9201-17; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.460-.470.
Hayes v. Howell, 308 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1983).
" Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 535 (1981).
I d. at 536.
a' Mixon v. One Newco, Inc., 863 F.2d 846, 849 (l1th Cir. 1989).
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After seven years of noncompliance the mineral rights may be
lost by a presumption of adverse possession." However, the
surface owner must file a petition for a declaratory judgment to
gain title to the mineral rights. 87 A judicial proceeding is needed
in Georgia.88 The notice provisions to be followed are set out in
the statute; service is to be the same as in an in rem proceeding,
including publication. 89 Whether these notice provisions are ad-
equate remains to be answered by the courts. The Supreme Court
in Short found that although the surface owner did not have to
give special notice to the mineral owner, failure to do so "cer-
tainly would preclude him from obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment that his adversary's claim is barred .... 9
CONCLUSION
The validity of dormant mineral acts was settled by the
United States Supreme Court in Short.91 However, the concept
of lapse statutes has been expanded by the validation of Geor-
gia's Dormant Mineral Rights Act. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Mixon92 and the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Hayes93 upheld the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute.
Georgia's statute allows only two ways of retaining the min-
eral interest. 94 The interest is retained by using the minerals or
by paying taxes on them within a seven year period. Both of
these options are designed to bring money to the state. Con-
versely, registration of the claim is not one of the options in
Georgia. Exemption of certain leases from the statute makes the
economic purposes of the statute evident-it allows the mining
industry to attract potential investors. 95
Lapse statutes emerged as a method of clearing title to real
property. Land increases in value when potential claims by un-
"GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168.
87 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(b)(1).
u Id. I
" GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168(b)(3).
10 Short, 454 U.S. at 536.
9, Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
Mixon v. One Newco, Inc., 863 F.2d 846 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
Hayes v. Howell, 308 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1983).
94 GA. CODE ANN. 44-5-168.
"Mixon, 863 F.2d at 851.
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known mineral owners are extinguished. 96 This increased value
provides a larger tax base on which to tax the property. Thus,
lapse statutes such as Georgia's may now be a new and important
weapon in a state's arsenal of revenue raisers.
Anna H. Ruth
0 Short, 454 U.S. 516; see also Short & Thomas, supra note 81.
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